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Article: 




Mark Twain's sense of morality was almost as fine as his sense of humor. Certainly the above quotation 
captures, with the pith typical of Twain, an important insight. Someone who can commit a wrong but deliber-
ately refrains from doing so warrants a sort of moral recognition that someone who is constitutionally unable to 
commit the wrong does not. (Twain's statement itself is heavily laced with irony. His point is that the apparently 
sanctimonious manner in which Washington confessed to chopping down the cherry tree served in fact only to 
disqualify him from the highest form of praise for not lying. Another source of the humor resides, no doubt, in 
the suspicion that Twain was not being wholly truthful about himself.) 
 
Whether someone can in fact be constitutionally unable to tell a lie is a moot point. It is likely that Washington 
was exaggerating somewhat, but maybe it is literally true of some people that they cannot (bring themselves to) 
tell a lie. Perhaps, too, it was literally true that Martin Luther could "do no other," although, again, I suspect not. 
It is a question of psychological capacity, and in many cases I don't know what the answer to it is. Could a 
normally loving parent kill his child for no good reason - say, to earn twenty dollars? Nothing easier, you might 
claim. He need only wield a knife, just like when cutting into steak. But it isn't "just like," of course; he may 
have no physical disability, but perhaps the love that he feels psychologically incapacitates him so that he 
literally cannot perform such an act (a matter not simply of difficulty but of impossibility).  
 
Whether or not psychological conditions can in this way render someone unable to do something, it is clear that 
they can render someone unable to feel something, and such an inability can have similar moral significance. 
Consider someone who knows no fear; such a person cannot of course conquer his fear, for he has none, and so 
he cannot earn praise for doing so. In general, someone who is not tempted cannot overcome temptation and 
thus cannot earn the pertinent praise. His inability disqualifies him. 
 
But if he is not a candidate for such praise, is he not a candidate for praise nonetheless? Isn't someone who is 
fearless admirable in a way in which a fearful person is not? Isn't someone who cannot tell a lie admirable in a 
way in which someone who can is not? If not, the sort of perfection that some take to be essential to divine 
beings would merit no praise, and this seems mistaken. In this respect Twain seems to have gone too far. Why 
say that he is morally superior to Washington? Why not just say that he is morally different, in that both merit 
praise, but of different sorts or for different reasons? True, there is a necessary interconnectedness here, since 
the two different grounds for praise cannot coexist: if one merits praise for the same reason as Washington, then 
one cannot merit praise for the same reason as Twain; if one scores high on one scale, one must score low on 
the other.
2
 This means that ambivalence toward Washington and Twain cannot be avoided, if one is to assess 
them adequately from the moral point of view. 
 
Or so I contend. There are very many who, I am sure, would agree with me, and it may seem that I am pleading 
for the obvious. Yet there are also many who would apparently disagree. Twain himself seems to do so; while 
sensitive to his own particular virtue, he appears to be insensitive to Washington's.
3
 Kant, too, is well known for 
a similar apparent insensitivity. He claims that only action that is performed from a sense of duty manifests 
moral worth, that other motives that are commonly taken to be morally significant, such as sympathy, in fact 
invest an action with no moral worth at all.
4
 Here Kant appears to be maintaining that there is only one moral 
virtue, that of conscientiousness, and that other traits that are often taken to be virtuous are in fact not so. This 
has struck many as unduly high-handed and narrowminded.
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 Let us by all means acknowledge the virtuousness 
of conscientiousness; let us even accord it a special place among the virtues. We can still acknowledge the 
virtuousness of other traits. If we do, we will recognize that a person is in principle open to a variety of moral 
assessments and, again, he may score high on one scale and low on another, so that ambivalence is called for. 
But that, I would contend, simply reflects the complexity of morality; to deny the appropriateness of such 
ambivalence is to oversimplify morality. 
 
If such oversimplification were rare, I would not now be trying to expose it. But it occurs frequently. Often the 
evidence is not wholly incontrovertible, but consider these recent examples. 
 
Ronald Milo, 1984: "[T]he commonly recognized excuses reflect our conviction that it cannot be fair to blame 
someone for doing something if he could not help doing it. . . . But when a person fails to control his desires and 
emotions in circumstances where most people are able to exercise self-restraint, then his lack of self-control 
counts as a shortcoming that justifies blame."
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 Here the suggestion seems to be that what frequently excuses 
may on occasion not excuse. The idea that there may be both excuse (for one thing — the uncontrollable action) 
and blame (for another thing — the shortcoming) is not entertained. 
 
Robert Adams, 1985: "[Alan] Donagan . . . concludes, 'A graduate of Sandhurst or West Point who does not 
understand his duty to noncombatants as human beings is certainly culpable for his ignorance; an officer bred 
up from childhood in the Hitler Jugend might not be.' I disagree with Donagan's conclusion. The beliefs 
ascribed to the graduate of the Hitler Jugend are heinous, and it is morally reprehensible to hold them. . . . No 
matter how he came by them, his evil beliefs are a part of who he is, morally, amd make him a fitting object of 
reproach."
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 Here Adams doesn't think of holding dual attitudes toward the Nazi, a refusal to condemn in one 
way but a readiness to reproach in another. 
 
Judith Thomson, 1989: "[A person] is to blame [that is, has no adequate excuse] for doing such and such . . . if 
and only if [his] doing the such and such gives some reason to think [him] a bad person. . . . Here is Edward, 
who [uncontrollably] tortured a baby to death for fun; it cannot be thought that he had an adequate excuse 
[grounded in lack of control] for doing that, since his having done it does give us reason, excellent reason, to 
think him a bad person."
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 Here Thomson explicitly disavows the sort of ambivalence I am advocating. Prior to 
this passage she entertains but rejects the possibility that judgements of blame or excuse (of some sort) should 
be independent of judgments as to whether a person is bad (in some other way). 
 
Many other illustrations could be given of instances where philosophers appear to have been insufficiently 
sensitive to the complexity of morality, to have insisted on a single evaluative judgment where several 
judgments seem to be called for. At this point, though, I need to be more precise about just what this complexity 
consists in. We can start with distinctions. First, we can distinguish between what is evaluated: a person, a 
person's character, a trait, a motive, an action (this list isn't meant to be exhaustive). Then we can distinguish 
between modes of evaluation. Here we meet with a wealth of available terminology. On the positive side: 
"good," "right," "praiseworthy," "laudable," "virtuous," "admirable," "commendable," and so on; on the 
negative side: "bad," "wrong," "blameworthy," "culpable," "vicious," "reprehensible," "reproachable," and so 
on. At the extreme, we could apply each of these epithets to each of the listed objects of evaluation and claim 
that in each case we get a distinct judgment. For example, the judgment that a person is praiseworthy would be 
distinct from the judgment that his act is praiseworthy, which itself would be distinct from the judgment that his 
act is right, and this would be distinct from the judgment that his motive is admirable, and so on. Further 
complexity would be introduced by allowing for the possibility that a certain object of evaluation (an act, say) 
merits a certain epithet ("right," say) in one respect or for one reason but doesn't merit this epithet or merits its 
contrary (here, "wrong") in another respect or for another reason. It will be appreciated that, by employing such 
distinctions, one can in principle form a myriad moral judgments. Moreover, when, on one and the same 
occasion, these judgments conflict, in the sense that some of the epithets belong to the positive (or negative) list 
while others do not, then one will have attained ambivalence. 
 
Now, I don't wish to plead for such extremism, to maintain that we must accept the distinctness of all such 
judgments. It may well be that, in certain cases, despite the superficial difference in object evaluated or in 
epithet used to express mode of evaluation, there is in reality only one judgment rather than two. For example, 
is there really a distinction to be drawn between the judgment that a person is praiseworthy for an action and the 
judgment (to use Kant's terminology) that that person's action has moral worth? I don't mean to settle this issue 
here. Its resolution would require a full-fledged, systematic moral theory, one which provides criteria for the 
application of each epithet to each object. That is a monumental undertaking. I have tried my hand at a small 
part of it elsewhere; I have argued for the claim that ambivalence is appropriate in cases like that of the graduate 
of the Hitler Jugend and have tried to rebut certain arguments to the contrary.
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 I don't intend to repeat myself 
here but wish merely to note the following. While simplicity in a theory is attractive, oversimplification (of the 
sort that I am alleging in the cases of Twain, Kant, and the others) is to be avoided. And so the question is, 
when is a simplifier an oversimplifier? It is at this point that argumentation is required. Even in the absence of 
such argument, though, it is surely reasonable to urge caution and to suspect distinctness in judgments unless 
good reason is provided for denying it. If so, the burden of proof will rest on those who resist ambivalence 
rather than on those who embrace it. 
 
Why is it, then, that this stance is so frequently ignored (even if, as I have acknowledged, it is also frequently 
adopted)? My guess is that those who resist ambivalence concerning a certain matter often do so because they 
regard such an attitude as paradoxical, as one that cannot be coherently maintained, as one that requires 
dissolution. But if this is their view, it is utterly mistaken. We are, or should be, familiar from childhood on with 
the occasional appropriateness of ambivalence, whether having to do with moral matters or with others. If I am 
having a good time on vacation but also miss home, then both when on vacation and when I return home I will 
be liable to mixed feelings. Nothing more natural — or appropriate. If I disavow one or the other feeling, then I 
will be acting inappropriately. It would admittedly be inconsistent of me if my mixed feelings concerned one 
and the same aspect of the object of my feelings, or if they rested on one and the same ground, but that is not the 
case in the present example. I enjoy the vacation because of where I am; I feel sad because I am away from 
home. Any hint of paradox in this ambivalence surely vanishes when it is made clear that the ambivalence has a 
multiplicity of sources and objects. 
 
While dissolution of such ambivalence is, therefore, not to he insisted on, it may yet be that a certain sort of 
resolution of it can be achieved. The appropriateness of conflicting judgments does not in and of itself preclude 
the appropriateness of some single, more comprehensive judgment. It may be that, on the whole, I am sad to be 
going home; I would prefer to stay on vacation. This seems perfectly intelligible, and it doesn't require that I 
inappropriately suppress the fact that I miss home. There is a straightforward moral analogue that W. D. Ross 
has given us. An act may be both prima facie right and prima facie wrong. These conflicting prima facie values 
render ambivalence toward the act appropriate. Nonetheless, if its prima facie wrongness outweighs its prima 
facie rightness, then it will be overall wrong, and the comprehensive judgment that it is overall wrong does not 
itself involve any ambivalence. The accuracy of this higher-order judgment does not, however, in any way 
invalidate the lower-order ambivalence. While there is a sense in which this ambivalence is resolved by the 
higher-order judgment, it is not dissolved by it. 
 
Here is another case. Suppose that someone acts negligently but means well — he desperately pulls someone 
free from an accident when he should have realized that this would result in paralysis. How should we judge 
this person? The negligence requires a negative judgment, the benevolence a positive judgment. Even if we also 
judge that, on balance, the person is to be criticized, we must not lose sight of the appropriateness of 
ambivalence on another level. 
 
With this in mind, consider this remark by Richard Brandt: "There are some things no decent person will 
believe to be right . . ., and if we must defend our act by saying we believed what no decent person would 
believe, we may have condemned ourselves more than excused ourselves." 
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 Read in one way, this seems quite 
right: if we believe what no decent person would believe, we are to be criticized (in one respect); if we 
truthfully say that we acted conscientiously, we are to be commended or, at least, not criticized (in some other 
respect); and the former judgment may be weightier than the latter. But if this passage is meant to suggest that 
somehow the partial, positive judgment (concerning an excuse) must be repudiated in face of the partial (and, 
because weightier, also overall) negative judgment (concerning condemnation), then Brandt is surely mistaken; 
for the positive judgment still stands. 
 
Sometimes, of course, the intelligibility of an overall judgment is uncertain. In such cases, ambivalence may 
seem to preclude not just dissolution but also resolution. In the case of a judgment of the overall rightness or 
wrongness of an act, such a judgment is normally regarded as perfectly intelligible (except possibly in certain 
cases of moral dilemma). But what about Brandt's case? Is there a sense in which the person is more to be 
condemned than excused? Here I am dubious.
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 This may be an area in which no overall judgment is possible 
because the various partial judgments concern matters that are strictly incomparable. But it is easy to 
overestimate the likelihood of strict incomparability. We may well agree with Isaiah Berlin, for example, that 
conflicts between such values as liberty and equality are, as Bernard Williams puts it, "ineliminable and not 
resoluble without remainder,"
12
 but are they strictly incomparable? Williams himself doesn't think so. A trivial 
gain in equality is not worth an enormous sacrifice of liberty, he says
13
, and this seems very sensible. If 
Williams is right, an overall judgment as to whether to promote liberty or equality is, in such cases, in principle 
attainable. Of course, there can be cases where it is not determinable which value is to be promoted, and it may 
be (as some have urged
14
) that this is due not to ignorance on our part but to the so-called limited 
incomparability of these values. But in such a case, I would claim, if it is admitted that the values are 
themselves strictly comparable (that is, that there are other cases where it is clear that they can be compared and 
that one or the other value predominates), then in these cases where no decision can be reached as to which is to 
be promoted, we should not infer that an overall judgment with respect to them cannot be made; rather, we 
should infer that there is an overall judgment to be made here, namely, that the values counterbalance one 
another. They can be weighed against one another, and in these cases the overall judgment is that the scale is 
evenly balanced.
15
 Still, in other cases, such as Brandt's, it may be correct to conclude that no comparison is 
possible and that therefore no overall judgment can be reached. Certainly I find such a position appealing when 
faced, say, with the question as to who is more virtuous, Twain or Washington. Is Twain morally superior to 
Washington? Not in my view. Nor is he inferior. Nor are they evenly balanced. They're just different, each 





1. As quoted by Peter van Inwagen in An Essay on Free Will (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), pp. 63-4. 
2. Cf. Michael Slote on the "intrinsic connectedness" involved in what he calls admirable immorality in 
Goods and Virtues (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), Ch. 4. Consider also the following exchange 
between Calvin and Hobbes (in the cartoon by the same name, created by Watterson) that appeared in 
the Sunday papers on December 20, 1992:  
Calvin (speaking to Hobbes while making a snowball): I wish Santa would publish the guidelines he 
uses for determining a kid’s goodness. For example, how much does he weigh motives? Does he 
consider the kid's natural predisposition? I mean, if some sickeningly wholesome nerd likes being 
good, it’s easy for him to meet the standards! There's no challenge! Heck, anyone can be good if he 
wants to be! The true test of one’s mettle is being good when one has an innate inclination towards 
evil. I think one good act by me, even if it's just to get presents, should count as five good acts by 
some sweet-tempered kid motivated by the pureness of his heart, don’t you?  
(At this point, Calvin sees Susie walking by, hurls the snowball at her, and hits her smack on the 
head.) Hobbes: Of course, in your case, the question is academic.  
Calvin: I wanted to put a rock in the snowball, but I didn't! That should be worth a lot! 
3. Contrast the sensitivity of Thomas Reid, as reported by Roderick Chisholm in "Human Freedom and the 
Self" (in Gary Watson, ed., Free Will (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982)), p. 26: "[An ancient] 
author had said of Cato, 'He was good because he could not be otherwise', and Reid observes: 'This 
saying, if understood literally and strictly, is not the praise of Cato, but of his constitution, which is no 
more the work of Cato than his existence'." Although he denies that Cato himself is to be praised, Reid 
does allow that there is occasion for praise nonetheless. Susan Wolf, on the other hand, would praise 
Cato himself, See her Freedom Within Reason (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 61. 
4. Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, Ak. 398. 
5. Cf. Richard Brandt, Ethical Theory (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1959), pp. 4701: "It might . . . be 
held . . . that behaviour is never reprehensible (or admirable) 'in the specifically moral sense, except as it 
manifests defect (or perfection) of conscientiousness. However, to hold this is a mistake ... [A] 
conscientious man may be blind to the problems of others; he may be insensitive and mistaken on some 
moral principles .. . [This] is reprehensible in the 'specifically moral sense., " Cf. also Thomas Nagel in 
Mortal Questions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), pp. 32-3. 
6. Ronald Milo, Immorality (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 222-3. 
7. "Involuntary Sins" (Philosophical Review 94 (1985), 3-31), p. 19. 
8. "Morality and Bad Luck" (Metaphilosophy 20 (1989), 203-221), p. 219. 
9. An Essay on Moral Responsibility (Totowa: Rowman and Littlefield, 1988), Ch. 4, Sect. 9. There I focus 
on Adams. 1 would attempt to handle in similar fashion Wolf s more recent argument, op. cit., p. 61. 
10. Op. cit., p. 473. 
11. Similarly, on p. 164 of The Elements of Moral Philosophy (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1993; second 
edition), James Rachels says that, although courage is admirable, courage deployed in an evil cause is 
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16. Whether or not this claim is opposed to the thesis of the unity of the virtues depends on two things: how 
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